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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003499

SIPDIS

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SUBJECT: READOUT OF TURKISH MFA U/S TUYGAN'S MEETING IN
TEHRAN WITH IRANIAN DFM AMINZADEH

REF: 2004 ANKARA 4421

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: MFA Iran Department Head Ulku (who did not go on the trip) asserts U/S Tuygan delivered a "crystal clear" message on Iran's nuclear program and the need to cooperate with the EU-3 and IAEA to DFM Aminzadeh June 11 but admitted Tuygan cloaked his message in diplomatic niceties. Without mentioning the U.S., Aminzadeh claimed Iran supports the Iraqi Transitional Government but is concerned at the situation in the north. Tuygan reportedly urged the Iranians to continue implementing their bilateral security agreement against the PKK; Turkey is "generally satisfied" with Iran's current efforts. Tuygan demurred on a renewed Iranian proposal for a gas pipeline through Turkey. End summary.

Atmospherics

2. (C) Ulku was at pains to characterize Tuygan's visit as "business as usual" and a "protocol visit" in return for Aminzadeh's visits to Turkey. Tuygan "felt obliged" to do this, according to Ulku, before the Iranian MFA is reshuffled in the wake of elections. Ulku described the talks as "warm and friendly," with both men agreeing bilateral relations are "generally positive."

Iranian Nuclear Program

3. (C) Ulku claimed that Tuygan was "crystal clear" with Aminzadeh about Iran's nuclear program. According to Ulku, Tuygan expressed concern for "nuclear proliferation in our region." When we pressed Ulku about whether Tuygan was any more specific, Ulku told us Tuygan used "diplomatic niceties" and was "candid but tactful."

4. (C) Tuygan conceded to Aminzadeh Iran's "right" to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Tuygan reportedly expressed "strong" support for the EU-3 process and urged Iranian compliance with the IAEA. Ulku said Aminzadeh appeared "comfortable" addressing the nuclear issue, claiming that Iran has undergone 1000 inspections over the past two years and is working with the IAEA.

5. (C) Aminzadeh reportedly acknowledged that the U.S. attitude on the EU-3 process is positive and claimed that the U.S. has made some overtures toward Iran. However Aminzadeh asserted that the U.S. insistence on cessation of all enrichment activity is making the process difficult; he encouraged a more "flexible" U.S. approach. He claimed to Tuygan that Iran is developing nuclear power for the long-term economic health of the country; Tuygan did not confront him with the fact that Iran had kept this supposedly-peaceful program covert. However, Aminzadeh said Iran does not trust the West because Germany ceased Iran's nuclear program in 1986.

Iraq

6. (C) Aminzadeh claimed to be supportive of the Iraqi Transitional Government and PM Jaffari. According to Ulku, Aminzadeh did not disparage or even mention the U.S. role in Iraq. He asserted Iran is trying to play a constructive role in Iraq. He did, however, express concern over the situation in northern Iraq, particularly Kirkuk, and criticized the opening of the Kurdistan regional parliament. Tuygan told him Turkey shares the concerns about the north and Kirkuk.

PKK

7. (C) Tuygan told Aminzadeh Turkey expects Iran's continued implementation of the bilateral security agreement on the PKK. Aminzadeh reportedly reiterated that Iran considers the PKK a terrorist group.

8. (C) Ulku said that the MFA has a "positive view" of Iran's efforts to control the PKK. The Iranian "administration" is making "genuine efforts" to control the PKK, he asserted, although other Iranian entities (NFI) "may

have different agendas." Ulku estimated there are 600-700 PKK in Iran and that they "come and go."

Afghanistan -----

19. (C) Aminzadeh claimed Iran deserves credit for helping the U.S. overthrow the Taliban and this demonstrates Iran can be "flexible" in its approach to the U.S. He professed to be upbeat about the situation on the ground and, according to Ulku, recognized the need for a "foreign presence" there.

Bilateral Economic and Energy Issues -----

10. (C) Tuygan and Aminzadeh agreed bilateral economic trends are positive. Aminzadeh again pushed for quick Turkish agreement to build a gas pipeline through Turkey to export Iranian gas to Europe (reftel). Tuygan demurred, replying that Turkey is open to discussing the project but considers it a complex technical issue requiring extended negotiation. Tuygan told Aminzadeh that Turkey's request to reduce gas prices under Turkey's 1996 agreement with Iran should remain between the companies involved and not be used as leverage for other issues (i.e., accession to the Iranian pipeline request).

11. (C) Tuygan said the negative experience of the Turkish/Austrian TAV consortium at Khomenei Airport is not an encouraging sign for foreign investors. Aminzadeh tried to explain this away as a domestic political debate between reformists and conservatives that did not target Turkey. Ulku told us that TAV definitely will not operate the airport, has begun to transport building materials back to Turkey, and is seeking indemnification from Iran.
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